From 983200f912f41ba75a873c011bfbcd3b0285bf4c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Havoc Pennington Date: Sat, 19 Apr 2003 16:16:24 +0000 Subject: 2003-04-19 Havoc Pennington * bus/driver.c (bus_driver_handle_hello): check limits and return an error if they are exceeded. * bus/connection.c: maintain separate lists of active and inactive connections, and a count of each. Maintain count of completed connections per user. Implement code to check connection limits. * dbus/dbus-list.c (_dbus_list_unlink): export * bus/bus.c (bus_context_check_security_policy): enforce a maximum number of bytes in the message queue for a connection --- dbus/dbus-sysdeps.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'dbus/dbus-sysdeps.c') diff --git a/dbus/dbus-sysdeps.c b/dbus/dbus-sysdeps.c index 62aa0b4b..7673085f 100644 --- a/dbus/dbus-sysdeps.c +++ b/dbus/dbus-sysdeps.c @@ -470,8 +470,8 @@ _dbus_listen_unix_socket (const char *path, * But there doesn't seem to be a good way to do this. * * Just to be extra careful, I threw in the stat() - clearly - * the stat() can't *fix* any security issue, but it probably - * makes it harder to exploit. + * the stat() can't *fix* any security issue, but it at least + * avoids inadvertent/accidental data loss. */ { struct stat sb; -- cgit